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On Social Network Position in Employment Law:
Conjectures for Charlie
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This paper, part of a Festschrift for Charles A. Sullivan, shows how
arguments from two of Sullivan’s papers on employment law would fare in
a world in which employers can easily see a worker’s or job applicant’s
relative position within a social or professional network. The paper then
uses Sullivan’s corpus of legal scholarship to illustrate some challenges to
using social network evidence in employment law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What if employers could see any worker or job applicant’s relative
position within a professional network? In this Festschrift essay, I consider
how legal arguments in two papers by Charles A. Sullivan would fare in the
counterfactual world in which anyone’s professional network position is
visible to employers and thus available as evidence in employment law
litigation. Then, I use Sullivan’s corpus of legal scholarship to illustrate
some challenges to collecting and using such evidence of network position.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Social Networks and Hiring
Since the mid-20th century, researchers have studied how and how
much a worker’s odds of getting hired or promoted or of quitting depend on
their relative position within a social network—the professional, friendship,
familial, or other ties between individuals or other actors in some population
of interest. In hiring, for example, employers tend to place more trust in
applicants referred to them by their current employees or others they already
know. Many employers also hire someone in part based on what they think
an applicant’s connections can do for the firm—more business, a better
reputation, or better information flow about industry innovations.1
One worry: Because people tend to connect with other people like
themselves (homophily),2 when employers rely on social networks to hire,
that tends to benefit those who are demographically or otherwise similar to
those doing the hiring, and that may increase segregation or limit mobility
within a firm, occupation, or industry based on race, gender, or other worker
characteristics.3 In the U.S., courts and commentators have discussed
homophily in the context of employment discrimination lawsuits against
employers for using word-of-mouth recruiting.4
In recent years, with the rise of online social media platforms (e.g.,
Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter), employers have used social media presence
not only to vet job applicants,5 but also to judge worker competence based
1 See generally Lori Beaman, Social Networks and the Labor Market, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORKS (Yann Bramoullé, Andrea Galeotti, & Brian
Rogers eds., 2016); Emilio J. Castilla, George J. Lan & Ben A. Rissing, Social Networks and
Employment: Outcomes (Part 2), 7 SOC. COMPASS 1013 (2013); Matthew O. Jackson, Brian
W. Rogers & Yves Zenou, The Economic Consequences of Social-Network Structure, 55 J.
ECON. LIT. 49 (2017); Jinhwan Jo & Jill E. Ellingson, Social Relationships and Turnover: A
Multidisciplinary Review and Integration, 44 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 247 (2019).
2 Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin & James M. Cook, Birds of a Feather:
Homophily in Social Networks, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 415 (2001); Jackson, Rogers, & Zenou,
supra note 1, at 56–58.
3 See Fabiana Silva, The Strength of Whites’ Ties: How Employers Reward the Referrals
of Black and White Jobseekers, 97 SOC. FORCES 741 (2018); David B. Bills, Valentina Di
Stasio & Klarita Gërxhani, The Demand Side of Hiring: Employers in the Labor Market, 43
ANN. REV. SOC. 291, 298–99 (2017); Aaron Clauset, Samuel Arbesman & Daniel B.
Larremore, Systematic Inequality and Hierarchy in Faculty Hiring Networks, 1 SCI.
ADVANCES 1 (2015); Natalie Wreyford, Birds of a Feather: Informal Recruitment Practices
and Gendered Outcomes for Screenwriting Work in the UK Film Industry, 63 SOC. REV. 84
(2015); Roberto M. Fernandez & Isabel Fernandez-Mateo, Networks, Race, and Hiring, 71
AM. SOC. REV. 42 (2006).
4 See BARBARA LINDEMANN, PAUL GROSSMAN & GEOFF WEIRICH, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW § 16.II.C (6th ed. 2020) (collecting cases).
5 See Matthieu Manant, Serge Pajak & Nicolas Soulié, Can Social Media Lead to Labor
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on their online network itself. Here is how a Swedish recruiter put it in a
recent study:
Well, in some positions it may be very important to have a
network in order to not get stuck in a rut. Because it also shows,
if you have many business contacts or . . . . Do you have a large
network on LinkedIn? Because you must be there [in LinkedIn]
today, if you’re working in the positions that I am recruiting for.
Are you? ‘Yes’ Ok, ‘check’. Then it’s, do you have a large
network showing that you’re actually networking? Because I’m
always asking, ‘What networks do you have?’ Because if you’re
an engineer without being active in networks, and don’t really
have any, how do you develop?6
Here, the recruiter focuses on the size of the applicant’s network as it appears
on the LinkedIn platform and infers from it how likely the job applicant will
keep up with recent developments in the field.
While employers may glimpse the size or other features of the job
applicant’s own professional network, it is harder to see the applicant’s
overall network position within a profession, industry, or other population of
interest. Platforms such as LinkedIn or Twitter allow users to export their
own data7 and sometimes notify those users about connections in common.
But these online platforms do not provide users a way to see the network
structure of everyone on the platform. They have offered researchers more
extensive data on platform users, but only in anonymized form.8 Moreover,
online platform participation among users in the U.S. varies considerably by
platform and is not representative of the overall population.9 Nonetheless,
some have studied social media activity on these platforms to approximate
social networks within a profession or industry.10

Market Discrimination? Evidence from a Field Experiment, 28 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY
225 (2019); Yoram Bachrach, Human Judgments in Hiring Decisions Based on Online Social
Network Profiles, in 2015 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DATA SCIENCE AND
ADVANCED ANALYTICS (DSAA) 1 (2015); Brenda L. Berkelaar & Patrice M. Buzzanell,
Online Employment Screening and Digital Career Capital: Exploring Employers’ Use of
Online Information for Personnel Selection, 29 MGMT. COMM. Q. 84 (2015).
6 Anna Hedenus, Christel Backman & Peter Håkansson, Whom Do You Know?
Recruiters’ Motives for Assessing Jobseekers’ Online Networks, INT’L J. HUM. RESOURCE
MGMT. 1, 15 (2019).
7 E.g., Exporting Connections from LinkedIn, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/hel
p/linkedin/answer/66844 (last visited, April 1, 2020).
8 Jeremy Kahn, LinkedIn Will Allow Economics Researchers to Mine Its Data,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0820/linkedin-will-allow-economics-researchers-to-mine-its-data.
9 Eszter Hargittai, Potential Biases in Big Data: Omitted Voices on Social Media, 38
SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 10, 16 (2018).
10 E.g., Folker Hanusch & Daniel Nölleke, Journalistic Homophily on Social Media, 7
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B. Measures of Centrality
If employers could fully see a job applicant’s ties to others within a
population of interest, i.e. their professional network, the next step would be
for them to choose how to measure that worker’s importance (their relative
position) in that network. Here, we briefly discuss the intuitions behind three
standard network centrality measures (among many) and how employers
might use them to assess network position.11 The point here is simple: just
as “importance” depends on context, choosing which measure of network
position to use depends on why the employer wants to measure network
position in the first place.
Figure 1: Hypothetical Social Network

To illustrate, Figure 1 depicts the fictional social network of ten
individuals presented in Krackhardt (1990).12 Each circle (“node”)
represents an individual (𝐴 through 𝐽), and each line between nodes
represents a social connection between them—here whether or not they
regularly interacted. The lack of a line between nodes denotes no social
connection between them.
DIGITAL JOURNALISM 22 (2019).
11 For details, see, for example, Stephen P. Borgatti & Daniel J. Brass, Centrality:
Concepts and Measures, in SOCIAL NETWORKS AT WORK (Daniel J. Brass & Stephen P.
Borgatti eds., 2019).
12 David Krackhardt, Assessing the Political Landscape: Structure, Cognition, and
Power in Organizations, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 342, 351 (1990).
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Any individual’s centrality (importance) in this network depends on the
measure. Here, we consider three centrality measures: degree, closeness,
and betweenness.
Table 1: Centrality Scores for Figure 1
id degree
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J

4
4
3
6
3
5
5
3
2
1

closeness betweenness
0.0588235
0.0588235
0.0555556
0.0666667
0.0555556
0.0714286
0.0714286
0.0666667
0.0476190
0.0344828

0.8333333
0.8333333
0.0000000
3.6666667
0.0000000
8.3333333
8.3333333
14.0000000
8.0000000
0.0000000

Degree centrality is a tally of the number of connections for each node.
In Figure 1, individual 𝐷 has the highest degree (6) and individual 𝐽 has the
lowest (1). This measure matters if, for example, the employer believes that
an employee with the most connections with other employees at a firm is
also the least likely of them to quit.
Closeness centrality is the reciprocal of the average length of the
shortest paths to and from all the other nodes in the network. It captures the
ability of any one person to reach anyone else in the network in the shortest
number of connections. By this measure, 𝐹 and 𝐺 are the most important
individuals in this network, because it takes the fewest connections on
average to get from 𝐹 or 𝐺 to any other node in this network.
To show how this works, here is how to calculate closeness for 𝐹. Start
by counting the number of connections in the shortest path from 𝐹 to each
of the other nine nodes in the network. For 𝐹’s shortest paths, it takes one
connection to get from 𝐹 to each of five nodes (= {𝐴, 𝐶, 𝐷, 𝐺, 𝐻}), two
connections to each of three other nodes (= {𝐵, 𝐸, 𝐼}), and three connections
to get from 𝐹 to 𝐽. Finally, take the sum of these connections (14), divide by
the total number of nodes (10) in the network, and (because we want higher
scores to reflect the shorter distances) take its reciprocal. The result: 𝐹’s
closeness score (= 10/14 ≅ 0.7142857). If we did this for all the nodes, we
would get closeness scores for each (Table 1).
For employers, this measure of network position might be useful if the
network depicts connections within an industry and the employer wants to
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assess how likely the worker is to receive some information (e.g., an industry
innovation). Here, closeness captures who is most likely to receive such
information, on average, if first sent from any other person in that network.
Betweenness centrality refers to the number of shortest paths passing
through any particular node that connects it to otherwise disconnected
subnetworks. Individuals with high betweenness might be attractive to
employers because they can function as bridges or brokers between
subgroups of people who otherwise are relatively isolated from each other
and may themselves be more likely to have better ideas as a result.13 Based
on this measure, 𝐻 is the most important actor because 𝐻 connects otherwise
isolated 𝐼 and 𝐽 to everyone else in the network.
III. DISCUSSION
This section considers whether the legal arguments in two of Charlie’s
papers, if otherwise sound, would remain sound in the counterfactual world
in which a worker’s relative social network position (i.e., that worker’s
centrality) is completely visible to any and all employers and thus available
as evidence in employment law litigation. Then, we use Charlie’s corpus of
scholarship to illustrate the main current hurdle to employer use of worker
network position: missing data.
A. Hiring Algorithms
In his 2018 paper on hiring algorithms, Charlie argued that the
traditional Title VII “disparate treatment” and “disparate impact” legal
frames fail when applied to hiring algorithms because, in the hard case, those
frames let employers escape Title VII liability for practices that Title VII
would prohibit if undertaken by humans alone.14
In general, machine-learning algorithms for hiring predict—based on a
set of observable applicant attributes—the values for some target variable of
interest that no one yet knows (e.g., whether that applicant, if hired, will meet
a quarterly sales quota). To do this, the algorithm first takes historical data
on past employees. That data not only contain information on their attributes
(e.g., gender, race, education, experience), but also the values for those
employees on the target variable of interest. The algorithm then “trains” on
that data, i.e., it calculates a function of the information provided (a model)
that best predicts the values of the target variable in the historical data. Then,
the algorithm uses that model on new job applicants to estimate the
probability for each value in the target variable. Above a certain fixed
probability threshold, the algorithm recommends hiring; below it, it

13
14

See Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes and Good Ideas, 110 AM. J. SOC. 349 (2004).
Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395 (2018).
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recommends rejecting the applicant.
In his paper, Charlie focused on the conceptual hard case for Title VII
doctrine: The employer or its human agents always do what the algorithm
recommends; they do not know in advance (of any litigation) the model that
the algorithm will adopt; they train the algorithm on historical data that is
itself unbiased and representative; and computational power is unlimited.
Accordingly, set aside cases of employers who intend to use the algorithm
to discriminate.15 Also, set aside whether an employer’s decision to add
fairness criteria into the algorithm itself exposes the employer to Title VII
liability if such criteria expressly accounts for race, gender, or other
protected characteristics.16
Now, suppose the hard case in which the algorithm, once deployed,
adopts a model that always recommends, for example, rejecting female job
applicants of childbearing age. What result?
First, the disparate-treatment frame does not apply, Charlie argued.
Even if we learn, upon inspection, that the algorithm assigned non-zero
weight to job applicants’ protected characteristics (e.g., applicant “sex”), the
algorithm itself cannot have the requisite illegal intent or motives, and
neither can the employer or its human agents, because they could not know
the algorithm’s model in advance.17 Thus, the plaintiff’s lawyer is better off
abandoning the disparate-treatment frame and arguing instead that the
employer, by using the algorithm, violated § 703(a)(2) of Title VII for
“classify[ing]” her in a “way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities . . . because of such individual’s . . .
sex.”18
Second, the disparate-impact frame may not apply if the algorithm’s
model counts as facially discriminatory. Some courts today still take
disparate-impact liability to require the challenged employment practice to
be facially-neutral,19 even though § 703(k), which Congress added in 1991,
does not expressly require that.20 That matters for Charlie because, while
using the algorithm does not count as “intentional discrimination” within the

15 See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 671, 692–93 (2016).
16 See generally Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 857 (2017); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15; Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel,
The Measure and Mismeasure of Fairness: A Critical Review of Fair Machine Learning
(2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.00023.
17 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 405–06; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at 699–
700.
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2018). See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 407–08; see also
Kim, supra note 16, at 910–16.
19 See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at § 3.1 n.18–19 (collecting cases).
20 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 410–11 n.56.
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meaning of § 703(k),21 it arguably counts as a facially-discriminatory
practice once the algorithm assigns non-zero weight to protected applicant
attributes.
Third, suppose the algorithm assigns zero weight to any protected
characteristics and still rejects all female job applicants of childbearing age,
because it weights other factors that strongly co-vary with protected
characteristics. If so, employers can escape liability by prevailing on its
defense to disparate-impact liability that relying on the hiring algorithm is
“job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.”22 On this point, Charlie argued that, assuming the target variable
is itself “job-related,” the employer will likely prevail on the business
necessity defense if the disparate impact is based on actual differences in the
target variable (e.g., productivity, job tenure) between races or genders.23
Fourth, because hiring algorithms are complex and only as effective as
the historical data on which they train, in the hard case, plaintiffs will have a
hard time defeating a business-necessity defense by showing “an alternative
employment practice” that produces less disparity but that the employer
refuses to adopt.24 Charlie also asserted that the requisite employer refusalto-adopt in effect limits this argument to cases where the plaintiff “learns
enough about the disputed practice to serve something very much like a
demand letter on the employer, which then fails to adopt the proffered
alternative.”25
If otherwise sound, do these arguments hold in the counterfactual world
in which hiring algorithms can train on, among other things, data about
worker network position? Answer: yes.
First, in the hard case, the algorithm still lacks intent or motive, and the
disparate-treatment frame fails, because even if the algorithm assigns weight
to applicant network position, it is a facially neutral practice in any case.
Second, if the algorithm still rejects all female job applicants of
childbearing age, in the hard case, employers can still escape Title VII
disparate impact liability by showing that the model that assigns weight to
network position is “job-related” and “consistent with business necessity.”
This depends on how well network position (alone or in combination with
other worker attributes) predicts the target variable (e.g., a salesperson’s
degree-centrality as a predictor of annual sales). Indeed, because hiring
algorithms are focused on prediction, not identifying causal mechanisms, we

21

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
23 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 411, 423–427; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at
706–12; Kim, supra note 16, at 866–67, 905–09.
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
25 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 428 (footnote omitted).
22
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can avoid debating which network centrality measure is most appropriate
and instead have the algorithm train on all of them.
B. Partial Enforcement and Non-Competes
In a 2009 paper, Charlie criticized the law that lets judges enforce
partially invalid non-compete and other contract clauses.26 When faced with
partly-invalid contracts, some courts edit out or interpret away the clause’s
objectionable parts and enforce what remains in a way to preserve what is
left of the private bargain. As a result, judges can modify contracts in this
way in some states for employee non-compete agreements.27
The problem, Charlie argues, is that this judicial practice makes
employers more likely to use, or keep on using, partly invalid non-compete
clauses. In any case, the employer benefits if a worker erroneously believes
that an invalid non-compete clause is enforceable and acts accordingly. If,
however, a worker challenges the clause in court and wins, then because of
partial enforcement, the employer has less to lose than it otherwise would
have, because the court will still enforce the valid parts of the clause. This
gives employers an incentive to continue using partly-invalid non-compete
clauses. Charlie’s argument implies that, all else equal, we should expect
fewer partly-invalid non-competes in states that bar partial enforcement than
in states that permit partial enforcement.28 Canvassing the competing
arguments, Charlie concludes that, given a partially-invalid non-compete,
the courts should refuse to enforce the entire non-compete, especially if the
employer uses that clause for other workers, unless the invalid part is minor
and unintentional.29
If otherwise sound, does this conclusion remain as sound if we could
submit evidence of a worker’s network position when challenging a noncompete? It depends on how much less likely employers would use partly
invalid non-competes, given the availability of such evidence.
To see why, consider a rival possible cause of partly invalid noncompetes: legal uncertainty about what counts as an invalid non-complete in
the first place. State common-law typically requires that non-competes
impose “reasonable” restrictions in relation to an employer’s “protectable”

26 Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70
OHIO ST. L. J. 1127 (2009).
27 DONALD J. ASPELUND & JOAN E. BECKNER, EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETITION LAW § 8.1
(2019); Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Enforceability, Insofar as Restrictions Would Be
Reasonable, of Contract Containing Unreasonable Restrictions on Competition, 61 A.L.R.3d
397, §§ 16[a]–21[d], 30[a]–34[b], 37–41 (1975 & Supp. 2020).
28 Compare WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2019), with TEX. CODE BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
15.51(c) (West 2019).
29 Sullivan, supra note 26, at 1175–76.
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interests.30 What counts as a “reasonable” restriction? In published court
opinions, judges discuss many factors, typically treat none as dispositive, and
write opinions that are often opaque as to how they weighed those factors.31
If this makes it hard to predict what a court would find invalid in the first
place, it may also thereby make it more likely that employers use all but
obviously invalid non-competes as boilerplate.
Suppose we supplemented the “reasonable” restriction standard by
providing that for anyone with a network position below a preset closenesscentrality score, the employer bears the burden under a more stringent
standard of proof (e.g., “clear and convincing”) that the challenged noncompete restriction is a “reasonable” one. In the fictional network in Figure
1, given a pre-set closeness-centrality threshold of 0.05, individuals 𝐼 and 𝐽
would benefit from the proposed rule. Here, the premise is that closeness
centrality captures how likely each node receives information flowing
through that network, such as information about new jobs within that
profession. Thus, the challenged restriction is prima facie unreasonable,
because it sufficiently reduces the odds that individuals below the threshold
will get a suitable new job.
If we adopted this proposed change, Charlie’s argument against partial
enforcement remains sound depending on how much partial enforcement
would affect the incidence of partly invalid non-competes, given that change.
For example, if the proposed change itself reduced the incidence of partlyinvalid non-competes to virtually zero, partial enforcement may be far more
tolerable to leave in place for the (now rare) case where a non-compete,
though declared invalid, was likely valid based on what the parties knew or
could have known ex ante. Conversely, if the proposal has zero effect on the
incidence of invalid non-competes, Charlie’s argument remains as sound as
it ever was.
C. Estimating Charlie’s Network Position
For now, we are far from the counterfactual world where employers can
easily see worker network position. This section identifies the main current
hurdle to employer use of worker network position: missing data.32 To
illustrate, I show what happened when I attempted on my own to discover
Charlie’s network position.
Any measure of social network position depends on how we define the

30 See generally COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian
Malsberger ed., 12th ed. 2018).
31 ASPELUND & BECKNER, supra note 27, at §§ 6.8–6.45 (collecting cases).
32 See generally M. E. J. Newman, Estimating Network Structure from Unreliable
Measurements, 98 PHYSICAL REV. E 1 (2018); Gueorgi Kossinets, Effects of Missing Data in
Social Networks, 28 SOC. NETWORKS 247 (2006).
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population of interest, as well as how much we know about the actors in that
population and how they are connected, if at all, with each other. The
population of interest is always a subset of everyone who is or has been on
planet Earth. For example, we have assumed that employers care about a
worker’s network position solely with respect to a “professional” network—
other people in the same occupation or industry. Accordingly, in measuring
network position, one must exclude some nodes and the connections to and
from them, either in defining the population of interest (boundaryspecification),33 or because one does not have any data about them. The
worry is that any connections to and from excluded nodes non-negligibly
affect a measure of network position. If, for example, we excluded 𝐼 and 𝐽
from the network in Figure 1, because they belonged to a different
“profession,” we would not see how 𝐻 is important on a betweennesscentrality measure, and thus well-positioned to serve as a broker or bridge
between professions.
To illustrate, consider my attempt to discover Charlie’s network
position on my own and unbeknownst to him, much as an employer might
do the same prior to recruiting. I started first by defining the population of
interest as “law professors in the U.S.” In academic year 2018, law schools
in the United States (n = 203) employed 9,663 full-time faculty members.34
To figure out Charlie’s network position within this population, I started first
online on the premise that electronic traces of Charlie’s connections would
help roughly approximate his professional connections. Table 2 reports four
online identifiers I found for Charlie.
Table 2: Online Identifiers for Charles A. Sullivan, 2020
Platform
work email
LinkedIn
Facebook
Twitter

ID
charles.sullivan@shu.edu
charles-sullivan-4003464
charles.a.sullivan.75
cas1234567

Each of these identifiers, if traceable, might have provided me with
some data of his ties to other U.S. law professors. For example, his incoming
and outgoing email would indicate who he emails, who emails him, and how
often they communicate, much in the way researchers have approximated
33 Kossinets, supra note 32; Peter V. Marsden, Network Data and Measurement, 16 ANN.
REV. SOC. 435, 439–40 (1990).
34 DataSet Faculty (Academic Year 2018), ACCESSLEX, http://analytix.accesslex.org/D
ataSet (last visited Apr. 9, 2020).
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social networks with data on emails between people within a firm.35 His
current employer (Seton Hall University) has this information on its servers,
albeit only for emails sent or received via a Seton Hall email account. In
contrast, online social media platforms can better capture cross-firm social
networks, but this depends on how often law professors use these platforms
to communicate to each other.
None of this data, however, is publicly available, and my best guess
was that Seton Hall University, Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter were not
going to hand them over. Moreover, even if they had let me see only
Charlie’s communications on these platforms, that would be an incomplete
picture of the complete network of law professors, and thus his true network
position among law professors. For example, it would completely exclude
subnetworks of law professors with whom Charlie had no connection.
To be sure, some researchers have exploited industry and occupational
norms to estimate professional networks independent of platform. For
example, researchers have used co-authorship in the corpus of published
scientific papers to estimate the networks between researchers within and
across different scientific fields.36 Despite similar studies of law
professors,37 co-authorship is rare in legal academia.38
Still, inspired by another of Charlie’s papers,39 I resorted to
approximating a subset of Charlie’s professional network by tracing
incoming and outgoing expressions of gratitude that appeared in the typical
acknowledgements footnote in his and other law professors’ published legal
scholarship.40 To do this, we (myself and student research assistants) first
obtained all of Charlie’s published scholarly papers up through 2018 from
the Hein Online database. For each paper, we identified all the professors
he thanked, if any, in the traditional acknowledgements footnote. Where
Charlie had a co-author, we assumed co-authors thanked each other, and we
treated paper and book co-authors alike. Then, we searched the usual law
databases for papers in which the author(s) thanked Charlie. For each of

35 E.g., Amir Goldberg et al., Fitting in or Standing out? The Tradeoffs of Structural and
Cultural Embeddedness, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 1190 (2016).
36 E.g., M.E.J. Newman, Coauthorship Networks and Patterns of Scientific
Collaboration, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5200 (2004).
37 E.g., Paul H. Edelman & Tracey E. George, Six Degrees of Cass Sunstein:
Collaboration Networks in Legal Scholarship, 11 GREEN BAG 2D (2007).
38 Michael I. Meyerson, Law School Culture and the Lost Art of Collaboration: Why
Don’t Law Professors Play Well with Others?, 93 NEB. L. REV. 547 (2015).
39 Charles A. Sullivan, The Under-Theorized Asterisk Footnote, 93 GEO. L.J. 1093
(2005).
40 See Jonathan I. Tietz & W. Nicholson Price II, Acknowledgements as a Window into
Legal Academia, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=35526
73 (reporting results of automated textual analysis of acknowledgement footnotes in 29,024
articles published from 2008 to 2017 in 183 law reviews in the U.S.).
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these papers, we also identified the other law professors they thanked.
This method, however, approximates not the network of all law
professors in the U.S., but only the subset of them connected to Charlie
through at least one other law professor. To use the same method to
approximate Charlie’s network position among all law professors in the
U.S., we would have had to collect and code all the (incoming and outgoing)
thanks in all published papers by all law professors in the U.S. during the
time of Charlie’s career thus far, including those professors that neither
thanked Charlie nor received thanks from Charlie.
This was infeasible, largely because we chose to code by hand to deal
with name disambiguation. Typically, bibliometric researchers face the
problem of author-name disambiguation in cases where different name
strings—arising from typical variations in spelling (e.g., “Charles A.
Sullivan,” “Charles Sullivan,” “Charlie Sullivan”), nicknames, and dataentry errors—all refer to the same person, as well in cases as where the same
string refers to two or more different people. These disambiguation
problems also apply to the names of people thanked in the
acknowledgements footnote. We also had to figure out whether the persons
thanked were professors or not (e.g., students, support staff) when the
footnote text did not so indicate. To be sure, unlike most professions, law
professors in the U.S. are specifically identified by name and other
biographical information in the American Association of Law Schools’
Directory of Law Teachers, an annual listing of law professors.
Unfortunately, Directory volumes are not currently publicly available in a
machine-readable format. Thus, we resorted to coding by hand and using
both the source material, Internet search engines, and the Directory in an ad
hoc manner to resolve ambiguities.
The result is a dataset that approximates the network of law professors
connected to Charlie (either directly or indirectly through one other law
professor) any some point during Charlie’s academic career. For ease of
exposition, we depict this network as four separate networks in four time
periods: 1975–1995, 1996–2005, 2006–2010, 2011–2018 (Figures 2, 3, 4, 5,
respectively). Each arrow from a node indicates an outgoing expression of
gratitude, and each arrow to a node indicates an incoming expression of
gratitude.
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Figure 2: CAS Network. 1975-1995

Figure 3: CAS Network. 1996-2005
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Figure 4: CAS Network. 2006-2010

Figure 5: CAS Network. 2011-2018
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Tables 3, 4, and 5 report the top six nodes based on degree-centrality
(incoming thanks only), closeness-centrality, and betweenness centrality,
respectively, for this network.
Table 3: Degree-Centrality, 1975-2018
Degree
Node Label
157
Charles A. Sullivan
43
Michael J. Zimmer
40
Tristin K. Green
36
Timothy P. Glynn
25
Kathleen M. Boozang
24
D. Michael Risinger

Table 4: Closeness-Centrality, 1975-2018
Closeness
Node Label
0.0002435 Charles A. Sullivan
0.0002179 Timothy P. Glynn
0.0002157 Michael J. Zimmer
0.0002153
Tristin K. Green
0.0002067
Marc R. Poirier
0.0002061
Frank Pasquale

Table 5: Betweenness-Centrality, 1975-2018
Between
Node Label
91140.82 Charles A. Sullivan
30208.40 Michael J. Zimmer
25567.50 Timothy P. Glynn
22892.29
Marc R. Poirier
22176.43
Tristin K. Green
15123.52
Brian Sheppard
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Again, these centrality scores capture one’s network position among
the subset of law professors in the U.S. connected to Charlie, not among all
law professors in the U.S. (our initial population of interest). This is why
Charlie himself ranks highest on all three centrality measures. All the other
top-ranked as central in this network do or did work at Seton Hall’s law
school at the same time as Charlie.41
Additional complications arise if we care about the strength of ties
between nodes in a network. When we say Charlie is “connected” to another
law professor, what do we mean? For some network connections, we can
operationalize whether the connection exists or not by searching for
relationships between the nodes of interest that are determined or recognized
by law (e.g., spouse, family member, co-employee), social norms (e.g., a
“romantic” partner), or mutual agreement (e.g., a LinkedIn connection,
Facebook “friend,” emergency contact). Then, we might rank order
individuals by type of connection, and within connection type, to capture
how “strong” those connections are, either by resorting to someone’s
perceptions of that strength (as reported in a survey) or a prior theory about
the dimensions of tie strength that can be directly measured.
Here, for example, though we did not account for it above, we might
believe that, in a network of law professors, co-authors are more strongly
connected to each other than those who write separately but exchange thanks.
Another example: because of concern about tie strength, we may assign less
weight to older thanks in estimating Charlie’s current network position. If
one is more likely to transmit information to another based on how strong
their professional connection is,42 then that probability may decrease as that
connection weakens over time. Accordingly, if we care about Charlie’s
network position because we want to know how likely he is to learn of
industry innovations, we may prefer to estimate Charlie’s network position
based on his professional connections over a more recent period (say, the
past decade) than over his entire career.
Measuring tie strength is further complicated here because thanking
norms likely vary by author and over time.43 For example, as the average

41 See AM. ASS’N LAW SCHS., DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS (2020), https://dlt.aals.org/
(Boozang: 1989–present; Barnes: 2001–present; Glynn: 1999–present; Green: 2000–2003;
Sheppard: 2010–present; Sullivan: 1978–present); AM. ASS’N LAW SCHS., 2011-2012
DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1104 (2012) (Poirier: 1991–present); id. at 1079 (Pasquale:
“since 2004”); id. at 1438 (Zimmer: 1978–2008). Poirier and Zimmer died in 2015. See AM.
ASS’N LAW SCHS., 2016 PROCEEDINGS 39, 42 (2016).
42 Minjae Kim & Roberto M. Fernandez, Strength Matters: Tie Strength as a Causal
Driver of Networks’ Information Benefits, 65 SOC. SCI. RES. 268 (2017).
43 Tietz & Price, supra note 40, at 29–30 (finding, in convenience sample of law faculty,
“wide variability in standards” for including peers in acknowledgements footnote).
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number of thanks per paper increases with the ease and frequency of
electronic communication between scholars, authors may tend to thank not
only more people, but also more high-status people, regardless of how much
or little they and the author interacted with them, so as to signal that author’s
own status or legitimacy as a bona fide member of a scholarly community.44
If so, we should expect higher-status scholars to receive more thanks on
average, and accordingly expect some measurement error when estimating
network position.
Finally, even if we converged on theory or collected better data, this
research strategy is extremely limited in capturing worker network position
in most fields, because most professions do not regularly assign credit or
authorship for work contributions in ways that are publicly available. Rarely
does a building display the names of all the engineers, architects,
construction workers, and others who made it, let alone how they interacted
with each other. The same holds for all the people in the supply chain for a
mass-produced product offered for sale. Moreover, most people within a
profession or occupation do not have social media presences on platforms
that record the kind of information we might use to estimate a worker’s
professional network position. Accordingly, we are today far from the
counterfactual world where most employers can see workers’ network
positions. As a result, we can do more now to prepare employment law for
when that world comes.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper argued that, in the counterfactual world of widely available
evidence of workers’ network position, we should expect little change in the
soundness of Charlie’s past legal arguments about hiring algorithms and the
partial enforcement of invalid contracts. Then, the paper used Charlie’s
corpus of scholarship to illustrate some current challenges to using evidence
of workers’ social network position in employment law.
V. COLOPHON
All figures and tables (except table 2) were created using R 3.6.3 and
igraph 1.2.5.45
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Sullivan, supra note 39, at 1101–08; Tietz & Price, supra note 40, at 32–33.
R CORE TEAM, R: A LANGUAGE AND ENVIRONMENT FOR STATISTICAL COMPUTING
(2020), https://www.R-project.org/; Gábor Csárdi & Tamás Nepusz, The igraph Software
Package for Complex Network Research, INTERJOURNAL 1695 (2006), http://igraph.org.
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